Avalanche Fatality Incident Summary Brief Description: On February 4, 1996, a single backcountry skier triggered a large slide in a historical avalanche chute in the Wheeler Peak Wilderness across from Taos Ski Valley. This avalanche was in an uncontrolled area well outside the ski area. The skier, male, age 38, was located by Toas Valley Ski Patrollers less than one hour after the avalanche during a hasty search. No pulse was evident. It appears the skier died of multiple trauma. Incident Narrative: A storm cycle on February 1st and 2nd brought about 24 inches of new snow to the Taos Ski Valley. This storm cycle included considerable winds and daytime temperatures in the 15-20F range. Extensive avalanche control was necessary at Taos Ski Valley during this storm cycle. Prior to this storm cycle, there had been infrequent storms, low snow depths, and considerable depth hoar formation. February 3rd and 4th were sunny and clear (around 0 degrees F at night) with a warming trend during the day. On the morning of February 4th, a well known local skier headed into the Wheeler Peak Wilderness, across the valley from Taos Ski Valley, with the intent of solo skiing the extreme slopes in the vicinity. The skier, a 38 year old male, was an avid skier with many years (10+) experience of climbing the steep terrain in the area to ski the various chutes and slopes. At various times in the past, this skier was cautioned by his friends on the Taos Ski Patrol about the level of hazard he was dealing with and the unpredictable nature of the snowpack. Alpine touring equipment was used for this trip. Just before noon, the skier entered a very long and steep WNW chute. The top of the chute is about 12200 feet and the bottom about 10500 feet. The slope is about 40 degrees at the starting zone and averages around 36 degrees for the main path. This is a very evident and active avalanche chute that historically slides naturally several times a winter. Just by coincidence, a ski patroller at his station, had brought his binoculars up that day and was observing the slopes across the valley. He noticed a skier in a chute who had made several turns. The patroller looked into the chute again about 30-60 seconds later and observed a large slide with the skiers tracks entering into the center of a crown. The crown appeared to be about 50 feet across and 3-4 feet deep, and the slide ran its full path. The patroller immediately notified the patrol dispatch - time was 1158. Though the incident was outside the ski area, the patrol knew the only chance for a live recovery was prompt action of their resources. Two dog teams, hasty teams, and ALS medical gear was immediately dispatched. The dog teams travelled by snowmobile and foot and were working the scene at 1228 (30 minutes from incident report). To get to the bottom of the slide required either an uphill thigh deep "posthole" hike, or flat and long traverse on alpine skis. Teams used both of these routes for access. By 1241, several hasty teams with probes and shovel packs had arrived on the scene and were conducting hasty searches. The avalanche deposition zone was rather large. The chute is narrow at first (around 100 feet) but gradually widens out to an area approximately 400 X 400 feet as the main deposition zone and another 200 feet above it. The deposition zone includes many patches of small trees and many likely catchment areas. This was a climax slide (obviously to the ground in the starting zone and much of the upper track) that ran approximately 1500 vertical (12000 to 10500 elevation) and spread the debris over a large area. Many tree branches and at least one tree trunk were included in the debris. The dog teams worked a wide section of the main deposition area and hasty probe teams worked the central part of the deposition (most likely catchment areas). No scent finds were made by the dog teams. A beacon search was also conducted (first with a single frequency, 457, then later with a dual frequency). A beacon signal was picked up, and an area probed and dug with no results. At 1244, a portion of a buried ski was found. Several patrollers concentrated probe searches near the ski. At 1254, a probe indicated a strike (56 minutes since estimated burial). At 1255, a head was exposed in 2.5 feet of snow and no pulse was found. By 1303, the skier was dug out sufficiently to begin CPR and attach a cardiac monitor. The Forest Snow Ranger had arrived at the site at 1255. The deposition at the burial site was 7-8 feet and hardened quickly. The skier was found face up, head towards the bottom of the slope, but at an angle with his feet lower than the head. The body was parallel to the slide path. Both skis were released during the slide, only one ski was found, no poles found and the skiers daypack was still attached. The skier was intubated and cardiac drugs administered. While CPR continued, the skier was packaged on a backboard, loaded into a rescue sled, and brought down to a staging area. At a staging area, at 1326, a doctor (from the local clinic) worked with the ski patrol paramedic for one last cardiac revival attempt - no success. Based on the mechanism of injury, a long slide through a rocky avalanche chute, and trauma signs, it appears the skier died of multiple trauma. There was no ice mask and the airway was not obstructed with snow. Two ski tourers had arrived at the site early during the incident, helped with the hasty search, and indicated that they had not seen any other persons in the vicinity. Visual search of the entire slide area (binocular for slide path, and on-the-ground for the deposition area) did not indicate signs of any likely additional burials. Dog team search and visual search for any additional victims was continued until 1350. The Taos Ski Patrol's response time and proficiency on this incident is to be commended. With the lack of quick and easy access to the site, a deposition area of this size, and numerous potential burial areas, the relatively quick victim location and administration of emergency medical care is exemplary. Prepared by: Rob Deyerberg, Snow Ranger 2/5/96 -------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 7 FEB 1996 23:02:11 GMT From: Rich Davidson Newsgroups: rec.backcountry Subject: Avalanche fatalaty near Taos I spoke to Ray Deveux, the avalanche safety officer for Taos Ski Valley. Here is a synopsis of his comments concerning the accident: The bad actor was 8 in depth hoar formed by a shallow snow pack over an extended period of time. The temp. gradient required to form TG is only 10 C/m. TSV had two weeks of below zero weather that contributed to the depth hoar formation in December and January. The real bad actor is the shallow snowpack - they never got more than 20 in of snow until mid January. The snow depth in the chute was 34-36 in. 8 in depth hoar on the ground, a couple of crust layers and another (thin?) layer of TG at 20 in. The slide ran on the ground. They saw a number of direct action slides during the recent storm of about 18 in (Fri and very early Sat), but none were on the ground. All were on layers higher in the snowpack. They saw no natural slides between the storm and Tim's avalanche - a full day and a half after the storm. (11 am Sunday) The storm was accompanied by 30 - 70 mph winds. Contributor to slope loading. He was skiing the chute. He was on a slope of about 34 deg - just below the fracture line. Just below him, the slope broke over to 38 deg. The chute was 40 m wide at the top (widest), hourglass shape with a 5 m narrow spot between rocks. The slope fanned out with the debris being about 80 m wide max. They found him 40 m above the toe of the debris burried by 2 to 5 ft of snow. It appeared he died of trauma from impact either in the narrow region of the chute or on the many 10 ft saplings in the chute. I forgot to ask Ray how they found him so quickly - the media says 15 -20 min after Ski Patrol arrived on site. That Sunday morning it got warm fast - it warmed up 7 deg (Celcius I think) by 11 AM - warm wind from the North. Contributor to loss of strength in the pack. All comments pertain to the immediate vicinity of the Taos Ski Valley snowpack. Any info presented incorrectly I am sure is my misunderstanding of Ray's comments. I appologize in advance. Let's use the facts of this tragedy to learn to enjoy the backcountry more safely. Rich Davidson