Avalanche Incident, 1997-1998 Season

[Official Reports] [Media Reports] [Other Sources]

Mt Hood Avalanche Fatality, May 31 1998

This report was prepared by Jim Frankenfield based on input from numerous people who were involved or on the mountain at the time. Some of these people remain unacknowledged either at their request or at my discretion.

The purpose of this report is not to pass judgement but to convey as accurately as possible what is known about this involvement. While some may call the errors made here blatant, or worse, it is important to note that many of these errors were duplicated many times over on Mt Hood on May 31, and that many of the same errors are repeated regularly. So while some may write this off with condemnation, we can only hope that others will acquire some awareness, learn something, and/or be reminded of the importance of sound decision making in the backcountry.

Quotes indicate material taken from various e-mail messages which I received, or from press reports in a few cases.

It is interesting that it was widely discussed in the SAR community that the climbing ranger on duty, Glenn Kessler, and his partner (a former ranger) had no avalanche beacons. While they would not have helped locate any victims it would certainly have made it safer for these two to enter the accident scene.

Weather

May of 1998 was the second wettest on record in over 100 years. Above timberline this copious precipitation was snow. The previous weekend had cleared somewhat Saturday, and the exposure to the sun created a high avalanche hazard. The weather on May 31 was clear, sunny, and very warm.

The freezing level prediction was for a rise from 7,500' to 10,000'.

Snowpack

An informal snowpack report stated:

"While flattening out a tent site, we dug a hasty pit. It looked bad, but we weren't on a particularly steep aspect at the time. There was a slab at the surface (3-4" thick "styrofoamy" breakable crust) with 8-10" unconsolidated powder (by OR standards, anyway) beneath, followed by another 3-4" slab, followed by more loose snow. I couldn't isolate a block to do a shovel shear test, as the surface crust would break and the column would fail."

The avalanche fracture line was reported to be more or less two feet deep which would have been the two new storm layers this informal snowpit report identified.

Terrain

The route this group (and others) were on is known as a dangerous slope. It is a lee slope which gets windloaded, and it receives direct sun early in the day. While the West Crater Rim route offers several advantages, minimal avalanche hazard is not one of them. There are numerous alternate routes - there is no compelling reason to use this one.

"The guide book Oregon High, as I recall, specifically states - Avoid this route during high avalanche danger as it is directly in the path of debris coming off Castle Crags and Crater Rock."

"The fracture line was plainly visible from many areas of the mountain. It was located over 3/4 of the way up the West Crater Rim face."

Avalanche Involvement, Rescue

Someone was able to videotape the slide from the Hogs Back and reported that the slide quickly picked up velocity and traveled over a rock band (terrain trap) which may also explain the trauma to the fatality.

"We had pretty much ruled out climbing before we went to sleep. The next morning we went to Illumination Saddle to look around and do some drills and stuff. As we were getting our packs together (10 AM--bright and early), we heard a slide go. As we traversed over to the saddle, we saw two large probe lines in a fresh-looking slide path. At first I thought it may have been a class doing an exercise (maybe the Mazamas?), but as snowcats began ariving and more and more people flocked to the scene, it became obvious that it was a rescue (or recovery, at that point). Pretty heavy scene...."

"The climb leader did indeed have a shovel. Not only that, but he descended the 1,000 vertical feet and quarter-mile distance to the downed climbers, on a sprained ankle, in a matter of minutes after the avalanche occurred. He extricated Matt Pennewell and Amy Horne extremely quickly, with appropriate triage and first aid, and likely saved Amy's life."

The leader initiated a hasty search using an ice axe until a skier with a probe pole arrived. He then directed the next person to arrive on the scene to the injured climbers above.

"My role in the rescue was in searching for the buried victim via probe line as he was not wearing a beacon. Once located he was dug out. His position was roughly face down wearing his pack and attached to approx. 20ft of climbing rope. He was buried approx. 150 ft up from the bottom on the debris and about 7 ft from the right hand side of the slide as you face up the slide path. (None of the distances were measured by me, they are approximations.) Though not medically confirmed, it appeared the cause of death was trauma, not suffocation. The victim was pronounced dead on the scene by qualified personnel."

Press reports state that the body was recovered after 2 hours from a depth of about 5 ft. One report indicates that the body was found by a rescue dog.

There were two rope teams in the group which was caught. Some press reports initially indicated that the first team triggered the avalanche, but this seems unlikely since the second team was not caught and people were left stranded up higher on a ridge. There are differing reports on the return of these "stranded" climbers. One report states that:

"These climbers on the ridge were all beginning climbing students, and they were in a state of shock after the accident. As a result, they were somewhat stranded on top of West Crater Rim. The rescuers had a few options to help them, one of which included having the 304th Air Rescue Squadron drop a few PMR members off on the summit with ropes, have them down climb to the climbers, and lower them on ropes. This plan was scraped as the danger was too high, and the climbers were encouraged to down climb the face themselves. This was VERY frustrating to the rescuers as the climber would start down climbing the face (facing the slope) and get about half way down, only to get scared and head back up."

Another report claims:

"They descended to the point on the ridge where we came up. They overcame their fear and built a bollard from which they down-climbed under a belay (2 ropes tied together) the original path up, one at a time. This was straight up the slope. They took great care to minimize exposure and to minimize distrubing the slope."

Hazard Indicators

There were numerous indications as to the high hazard. Some reports mention many experienced leaders/groups cancelled their climbing plans.

The hazard situation was noted at Timberline Lodge:

"The climbing ranger (Glenn Kessler) had posted a dire warning about the high avvy hazard, and cited the accident last weekend."

"He said the warnings, including one posted at the climbing registration point, were such that anyone on the mountain should have been watching for potential avalanches."

However, according to many accounts the warning in the registration area was not professionally prepared and had no date of issue or expiration. The group leader claimed they thought it was old and had expired.

Recent activity was abundant:

"Before dark we could see where big slides had gone recently up higher in the bowl. Some really impressive ones--long, deep crown lines crossed near the top of most every slope." [In reference to the West Crater area.]

"Apparently they would have had to walk directly over debris from a previous large slide off of crater rock."

Human Factors

Where to begin?

First of all, this group was not alone in its judgements. Some others were very lucky. One report indicates that this group stopped to let two other large groups pass. [While four people were involved the group size was ten to twelve, so between this group and the ones which passed the situation could have been much worse.]

"Also, there were lots of climbers on steep slopes (like the E facing aspects of the west crater rim) which hadn't released and were baking in the sun. I think they need to install a blinking neon sign up there that says "don't climb now" for some of those folks who subscribe to the lemming mentality...."

"I saw two backcountry skiers literally ski over the avalanche debris, onto the lower slopes of West Crater Rim which had not slid yet, and then ski into the bowl at Illumination Saddle. In this instance, a blinking neon sign stating "DANGER!!!" might have been useful."

Group Dynamics and Communication

"This was a Mazama beginning climbing school climb. Apparently it is quite difficult to get accepted for this class as it was in such high demand. Several weeks of poor weather may have increased the pressure to climb. Also, my understanding is that the Mazama's do not include avalanche education in their basic school. As a result, the students on this climb were probably not aware of the hazard and therefore may not have been as understanding if the leader choose to turn the climb around in the middle of a clear, calm, sunny day."

Actually, it is my understanding that this was not part of the basic class but was a regularly scheduled Mazama climb. There was some sort of preference given to recent school graduates but the class had been completed and this climb was not part of it.

Given the size of this group, the fact that some of them had trained together in a class for some time, and the notices posted at the climbers register, one has to wonder why there was not a single person who expressed any doubt about the decisions made, particularly the choice of route. [The terrain is visible from below.] One common problem is people having doubts and not bringing them up.

There was at least one other case of this the same day. The following quote from the press is in reference to very experienced climber:

"He said climbers knew conditions were hazardous Sunday. Even the group he was climbing with considered turning around before the avalanche let loose on a route near where they were climbing. He said he constantly was assessing whether to turn back "even though there were people in our group who were set on reaching the summit." "

Leadership and Experience

The class/climb leader was reported to have been a very experienced climber with experience in South America (Peru and Argentina), the Himalaya (Gasherbrum I twice), and elsewhere. He had been expedition leader or assistant leader on some of these trips. He had taken and taught avalanche safety classes.

There are at least two things to draw from this, although I do not know which if either applied in this case. Some very experienced climbers have been very lucky and climbed hazardous slopes without incident despite being largely ignorant about avalanche safety. And even the best of leaders make errors at times - none of us are perfect. This is one reason group members need to prepared to express concerns whenever they arise.

Conclusion

Given the number of people who chose to be on this terrain, and the number who were climbing too late in morning, this situation may go beyond what we usually call the "human factors" of the group and enter the wider realm of social behavior. There is clearly a lot of education to be done. And we are clearly reminded here, once again, that snowpack subtleties and misread snowpits are not behind most recreational incidents - humans and decisions are. Avalanche Education classes need to respond to this reality. Some do, more need to.

Avalanche Accident on Mt Hood, Oregon-5/31/98

Northwest Weather and Avalanche Center

Date: Sunday morning, ~10:25 PDT 5/31/98

Location: slab fracture occurred ~200 vertical feet below the westernmost summit ridge at 10,800 ft.; climbers caught about 100 vertical feet below

Type: SS-A0-3, 300 feet wide, 2 ft average slab depth-crown fracture varies from 1-5 ft.; SE exposure; slide ran from approximately 10,800 ft. level to 9,550 ft. level (1250 ft. vertical); slope angle at fracture line ~35-40 with the climbers on ~25-30 slope at the time of slide release.

Accident Description:

A group of 10 climbers (Mazama basic climb school) was ascending the West Crater Rim Route on the south side of Mt Hood (an alternate to the standard south or hogsback route) on the way to the summit mid-morning Sunday, May 31st , when either warming, melt or weakening of recent snow combined with the weight of the climbers to produce a relatively large slab avalanche.

Intermittently wet weather with generally lowering freezing levels had been received during much of the preceding week, and this had produced an estimated 1-2 feet of new snow at higher elevations on Mt Hood, with the bulk of new snow falling at relatively low snow levels (~6-7000 feet) on Friday. While some showers occurred in the area Saturday morning, partial clearing Saturday afternoon was followed by further clearing late Saturday. This allowed late afternoon sun and rising freezing levels late Saturday to produce surface snow melt of the upper 1-2 inches of snow. This was followed by clearing skies and radiational cooling of the previously melted snow overnight, which helped form a briefly stabilizing 1-2 inch thick surface crust over much of the recent new snow. At the time of the accident Sunday morning, the weather was fair and both the air and snow were warming rapidly, with a freezing level around 10,000 feet (Salem in Oregon reported a 9993 ft freezing level Saturday afternoon, an 11,451 ft freezing level early Sunday morning and a 12,125 ft freezing level later that afternoon).

Earlier climbing parties (leaving Timberline around midnight) had apparently summited Hood while climbing predominantly on this firm crust. However by mid morning the crust had deteriorated significantly, with some climbing parties reporting postholing through the recently received snow to an old crust, with the recent snow probably containing some weak layers near the old snow surface. The main climbing party involved in the accident consisted of three roped teams of three, who were being assisted by an unroped leader who was apparently traversing between the groups to lend assistance.

Suddenly a loud crack was heard and the slab slide (approximately 2 feet average depth by 300 feet wide) overwhelmed the lead rope team and the climb leader, sweeping them downslope (the two trailing rope teams were not involved in the slide, but were left above a steep slope near Hawkins Cliff). The crown of the slab lay approximately 100 feet vertical above the highest rope team at the time the slide was triggered. Although the leader lost his ice axe he was able to fight the slide and come to rest before being swept over a steep (~45-50) breakover in the slope. The rope team, however, was swept over the steep breakover, through the Hot Rocks area and downslope through the gully between Crater Rock and Hawkins Cliff/Castle Crags a considerable distance. Having been carried down from 10,700 ft., two of the rope team came to rest and were partially buried at ~9,850 ft. (rope still attached between them), with the third member completely buried at ~9,650 ft. (the rope having been severed). The leader of the group descended the slide path looking for the rope team. He found one person buried to his waist and another mostly buried with only her head and arms above the snow surface. He partly extricated these two stunned victims and then proceeded downslope to look for the other victim.

Meanwhile, several other climbing parties had witnessed the accident. Witnesses on the south side Hogsback alerted a US Forest Service climbing ranger on patrol who was a few (~50 ft.) feet below them and climbing with a member of Portland Mountain Rescue-who was also a former climbing ranger. The ranger and Mountain Rescue member organized a 4-person hasty team which included themselves. They recruited volunteers among the climbers on the Hogsback to assist with communication and other aspects of the Search and Rescue event. The rescue team then traversed across the Hot Rocks area to the slide path and then descended the path into the debris, performing a quick hasty search. Having marked scattered gear along the slide path, the rescue team came upon the two partially buried victims (who had been found earlier by the climb leader).

Two of the rescuers proceeded to further extricate and stabilize these injured climbers, while the other two rescuers continued down toward the toe of the slide performing a further hasty search for visual clues. Because the partly buried victims reported that none of the team members were wearing transceivers and no signal was detected, probe lines were organized. About ten other climbers were at the scene when the two rescuers arrived near the toe of the slide. These individuals were haphazardly probing the relatively large debris area with ski poles. In this area the slope angle was now ~25 and the slide had narrowed to about 60 feet; associated avalanche debris spread over an area that measured about 60 ft. wide by 500 ft. upslope distance, and ranged up to 8+ ft deep at its deepest point near the toe. The rescue team leader organized the volunteer searchers into two probe teams, one working a line up from the toe of the slide and the other working a line about 250 feet above them. Because a trail of blood was faintly evident on the right side (climber's right) of the debris path the teams were instructed to work this side of the debris. Members of Portland Mountain Rescue who were on Ready Team patrol were dispatched and arrived within minutes to assist search and rescue efforts. As more volunteers arrived on the scene, they were added to the probe lines.

Permission having been granted to bring motorized transport into designated Wilderness, two Timberline Ski Area snow cats were dispatched to haul up additional search gear, personnel, and an avalanche dog and handler. The probe lines continued to move up the slope as the dog arrived and began to work the debris area without luck. Close to the area of the largest debris buildup, on the right side of slide path, the lower probe line called a strike. Upon digging down some 4½ feet at the strike location the third victim was found lying face down oriented with his head upslope. This victim was uncovered about 1½ hours after burial. He was not breathing and had no pulse. It was readily apparent that death resulted not from suffocation but from significant injuries suffered in the fall.

Of the two partially buried climbers, the more seriously injured victim suffered a fractured pelvis, a fractured tibia/fibula and an assortment of severe internal injuries. The other injured rope team member suffered a fractured ankle and facial lacerations. Having been stabilized at the scene, both injured climbers were transported by snow cat to Timberline Lodge and then onto a Portland hospital, the more seriously injured being transported by Life Flight and the other by ambulance. The team leader suffered a sprained ankle and he descended on foot with the remaining 6 members of his team, who had, with some assistance, slowly descended from their position on a portion of the slope that had not avalanched.

Another party consisting of two small rope teams and two unroped members was only 100-150 feet ahead of the rope team caught in the slide when the avalanche occurred. This group was directly along the right flank (climber's right) of the slide and just beyond the fracture, except for one roped member who was knocked down and carried ~100 ft slope distance before his fall was stopped by the self arrest action of another team member. After this mishap, this entire party continued up to the summit unaware of the larger accident and the fatal nature of the slide they had narrowly escaped.

During the rescue and recovery, further daytime heating and strong late spring sunshine combined with the recent snow to produce other natural avalanches around Mt Hood, fortunately none of these in the vicinity of the rescuers.

Posted in the Forest Service Climbers' Register at Timberline Lodge was a sign stating " AVALANCHE HAZARD! on the upper mountain". ( However, according to many accounts the warning in the registration area was not professionally prepared and had no date of issue or expiration. The group leader claimed they thought it was old and had expired. ) Both parties involved in the slide had signed in and obtained Wilderness permits at the Climbers' Register in the early morning hours on Sunday.

Comments: It is interesting to note that despite the previous week's weather most of the other climbing parties on the mountain at the time of the accident were not carrying avalanche beacons. Although several climbers owned beacons, they had left them in their vehicles near Timberline.

As this was the first clear weekend day in some time on Mt Hood, approximately 100-120 climbers had signed up to climb the mountain. Some of these climbers who were later interviewed remarked about how beautiful the day was, and about the fact that they hadn't really considered avalanches to be a problem-after all it was late in the season and it was such a beautiful day. Such remarks seem to emerge as part of a general theme of common mistakes when considering late season avalanche accidents - i.e., a part of the theme that "avalanches don't happen on beautiful days". Unfortunately, minds seem to wander in May and June and often tend not to include-or at least to minimize- avalanche danger as part of the mix of reality that should be considered. In fact, presumably for these and other reasons, a secondary maximum in monthly Northwest avalanche fatalities occurs in May-a maximum not too far removed from the mid-winter Northwest maximums of January and February.

Media Reports

Slide no surprise, experts say
By Terry Richard of The Oregonian

A wet May made the West Crater Rim route dangerous enough that two other groups canceled.

Conditions were ripe for an avalanche Sunday morning when one climber was killed while ascending Mount Hood and two others were injured.

The three were climbing together as a rope team when a massive slab avalanche, estimated by witnesses at 900 feet wide with a two-foot deep fracture, swept down the mountain from 10,600 feet to 9,500 feet west of Crater Rock.

"I think it was stupid for them to be there," said Rocky Henderson, a board member of Portland Mountain Rescue who was on the mountain and among the first to respond. "There were indicators at the base of Crater Rock of recent avalanches all over the place."

A graduation outing for the three-month Mazamas basic climbing school, the climb of the West Crater Rim route was led by Ethan Van Matre of Vancouver, Wash. A Mazamas member since 1972 and a veteran of climbs in Peru and Pakistan, Van Matre was climbing unroped and narrowly avoided being swept away when the slide occurred just before 10 a.m. He suffered a slight ankle injury but assisted in the rescue.

The accident killed Tom McGlinn, 39, of Portland and injured Amy Horne, 44, and Matt Pennewell, 28.

Van Matre declined to speak about the accident. Mazamas club protocol says its president is the sole source of information after an accident.

"Few people in our organization have stronger overall climbing resumes in zones where avalanches occur than Ethan," said Robert S. Hyslop, Mazamas president.

The Mazamas, Portland's mountain climbing club, was founded in 1894 and lists among its members many of Oregon's most active climbers. The third-oldest mountaineering club in the country, it annually leads 300 climbs to mountains of the West.

The club's climbing school teaches 250 novices each spring how to travel over snow and ice and basic rock climbing skills. The basic class begins in March and culminates in May with an ascent of a glaciated mountain.

This Mount Hood climb had been scheduled since March, when the club published its 1998 climb schedule. The club had three other Mount Hood climbs scheduled for the weekend, but two were canceled by the leaders. The other reached the summit via the more difficult Wy'East route.

"Ethan chose West Crater Rim because he enjoyed it," Hyslop said. "He had been up it 11 times before and said the avalanche gave no warning. I wouldn't have expected a slab of that magnitude at the upper level of the mountain at this time of year."

Avalanche warnings for Mount Hood had been posted May 24. The warning was issued by Glenn Kessler, who works as a climbing ranger for the Mount Hood National Forest. ( Note: However, according to many accounts the warning in the registration area was not professionally prepared and had no date of issue or expiration. The group leader claimed they thought it was old and had expired. )

As one of the wettest Mays in history gave way to sunshine during the weekend, about 100 climbers registered their intention to climb the mountain's South Side route from Timberline Lodge. Conditions might have kept down the numbers, which can reach as many as 400 on a sunny May weekend, according to Henderson.

The Mazamas climbing party left Timberline Lodge about 1 a.m. and slowly made its way up the mountain. Instead of climbing the standard South Side route, Van Matre had chosen the West Crater Rim route.

The routes are the same below 9,000 feet, but instead of going around the east side of Crater Rock, Van Matre chose to go on the west side of the prominent feature at the 10,000-foot level of Mount Hood's south side.

The South Side route can become a bottleneck when several climbing teams are on the mountian. Climb leaders sometimes prefer the West Crater Rim route as a less-crowded variation.

After passing west of Crater Rock, the Mazamas climbed a steep section of snow to reach a rocky outcrop at 10,600 feet. The climbers took a break and were about one hour behind schedule, not unusual for a climb that includes beginners, according to Hyslop.

But that extra hour of sunshine might have been fateful.

"The sun was already on their slope," said Mark Kelsey, a guide for the Northwest School of Survival who was also on the mountain. "Those people were running a class in the most dangerous spot on the mountain at that time. It was just a bad timing thing."

The Mazamas group stopped to allow two other rope teams of seven climbers to pass. When the lead Mazamas team of three climbers continued, its weight was a factor in triggering the slide, according to Hyslop. The last two climbers from the party that had just passed narrowly avoided also being swept away.

The massive slide swept the first Mazamas rope team of three from 10,600 feet and carried them to the 9,500-foot level.

Pennewell and Horne remained tied to each other, while the portion of rope connected to McGlinn was severed by the power of the slide. Rescuers arrived on the scene within a few minutes. They recovered McGlinn's body only after searching for an hour and a half.

"Even if we had found him sooner, it looked to me like he would have been dead from the trauma," Henderson said.

The climbing team was carrying a Mount Hood Locator Unit, an electronic device that helps rescuers find climbers in a storm but plays no role in an avalanche. The climbers were not wearing avalanche transceivers, radio signal devices that help rescuers locate climbers buried in snow.

Other Sources

www.avalanche-center.org