February 20, 2026: The Feb 17 Sierra Avalanche - Comments and Questions
The Feb 17 Sierra Avalanche - Comments and Questions
February 20, 2026
Jim Frankenfield, Avalanche Center director
On Feb 17, 2026 a large avalanche struck a guided group returning from two nights at a hut. The group consisted of 11 clients and 4 guides from Blackbird Mountain Guides.
First I will provide a little background, then some clarifications to issues which seem to be misunderstood by some in the general public, and finally some questions which will need to be answered prior to drawing conclusions or assigning blame. This is not intended to be comprehensive, nor to reach any conclusions about what happened or why.
Blackbird Mountain Guides deserves an opportunity to answer and respond to these questions, and the families of the deceased deserve answers which are thorough and properly researched. The answers will take time, some may ultimately come from investigations by the Sheriff or Cal/OSHA (ongoing already) or from legal cases (which seem likely). At this point (Feb 20) we should not jump to conclusions.
Comments and questions are welcome at the end of the full entry, no registration required. Moderation does take some time due to all the junk/spam. You can also comment/discuss/etc on Facebook on our discussion group (public) at https://www.facebook.com/groups/266870495913623
Background
There are a few things which should be noted while considering the factors behind the incident. Particularly concerning the guided aspect of the trip. These are offered as statements which I believe may be relevant, they are not intended to imply anything.
According to some comments the cost of the three day two night hut trip was $1165 per person, and there were 11 clients. Assuming this cost is accurate and all clients paid that amount the total comes to $12,815. Some of this would be for the hut reservation and supplies. (I have not verified or confirmed these numbers myself.)
Blackbird Mountain Guides has a very restrictive cancellation policy. There is essentially no refund and once a trip is booked participants are expected to go unless the guide service cancels. The policy on their website explicitly states that bad weather is not a reason for clients to back out with a refund.
On their website the guide company states “If you’ve booked the Frog Lake Huts in Truckee, trust our guides to elevate your trip to the next level. We’ll navigate in and out of the huts, manage the risks, and find the best terrain and snow quality for you and your group!”
The individual guides are all certified avalanche instructors for AIARE, a curriculum provider for avalanche safety courses. They are also certified as guides by the AMGA, American Mountain Guide Association.
The huts are very popular, booked for two nights at a time, and bookings sell out soon after they open for the season.
Clarifications
Due to the severity of the incident it has attracted a lot of media attention and a lot of comments by a wide variety of people. Many do not appear to appreciate the nature of the trip or to understand some basics of backcountry recreation and avalanche safety. This is entirely understandable.
These clarifications may seem like statements of the obvious to many whole follow and use this website, or recreate in the backcountry.
Some comments ask why the area was open at all. The huts are located in the backcountry, on land owned by a land trust. Access is via routes (trails) on public Forest Service land. This did not occur within any managed terrain such as a downhill ski area. Many ski areas closed, partly or entirely. Public lands don't close, they are (more or less) accessible to the public at all times. With or without guides.
People comment that the group as whole was too inexperienced, or did something wrong. This was a guided trip for people with backcountry skiing skills but not necessarily adequate risk management or avalanche safety skills. The participants would have all been competent skiers and at least some would probably have had basic avalanche rescue and safety skills. They chose to hire a guide service in recognition of their need for more professional guidance and risk management.
When guides are paid to be responsible for clients they have a duty of care. Final decisions are up to the guide(s), not the clients. Clients can, and often do, express preferences and opinions but the guide(s) make the final call. This should be kept in mind when considering the questions which follow.
Avalanche Beacons - Some who comment do not understand what they are and what their limitations are. These are carried by each person in a group and are used to find any others in the group should they become buried. These are local devices, the range is suitable for partners to search. People have asked if they had these, or why not (implying they lacked them). The entire group had avalanche beacons and in fact the survivors successfully used them for locating some party members.
Avalanche "Flotation" Packs - Numerous people ask why they did not have these. There is no indication they did, nor any that they did not. These packs work on "inverse segregation" - when particles are shaken large ones end up on top. (Try this with a can of mixed nuts.) If the person manages to deploy the pack before or during a ride they have a good track record. Assuming no trees, rocks, etc. If the snow comes down from above onto a person or group they are not so useful. It appears that is what happened in this case. Carrying them on a trip like this would be appropriate but in this particular avalanche they may not have helped much. They do not replace beacons, they supplement them. One analysis in the US and Canada indicates that, overall (in all kinds of avalanches), they improve survival odds about 11%.
Questions to be Answered
Many questions are being asked more as statements than questions. Blackbird Mountain Guides deserves an opportunity to answer and respond to these questions, and the families of the deceased deserve answers which are thorough and properly researched. The answers will take time, some may ultimately come from investigations by the Sheriff or Cal/OSHA (ongoing already) or from legal cases (which seem likely). At this point (Feb 20) we should not jump to conclusions.
1) Why did they go out in such storm conditions?
Guide services do operate in dangerous conditions, it is not unusual or unprecedented. Group management and terrain choices play important roles in doing this safely. We don't know if they had a thought-out or written risk management plan. If they did we don't know if they followed it or deviated from it.
This was a multi-day trip beginning Sunday and the avalanche was on Tuesday. The avalanche bulletin on Sunday morning gave a danger rating of Moderate (2/5) with a predicted Considerable (3/5) Monday. It did not extend beyond that. A short time after it was published an Avalanche Watch was issued, which means a warning may follow. There was passing mention of a major storm cycle but not a lot of emphasis. It refers people to the Reno National Weather Service (NWS) for weather information.
On Tuesday morning the bulletin rated the danger as High (4/5). The group was at the hut at this point, on their final day with plans to leave and go home. We don't know how much information they got while there, or what the sources were. They claim their guides were in contact with their head people in the office, and the hut had communications available.
Aside from the avalanche bulletin the NWS had been forecasting the storm for some time. However, the details available on the timing and the accuracy of such details is not clear right now.
Given the cancellation policy it would have been hard for clients to decide not to go, especially given that the guide service indicates that weather is not a good reason. It would have been mostly up to Blackbird Mountain Guides to make a decision to cancel.
One way for guides to manage risk during high danger is to choose the terrain appropriately. In this case there was a hut reservation so aside from choosing one of several routes the destination was fixed.
2) Why didn't they stay at the huts on Tuesday, given conditions?
This is assumed to have been an option. It may have conflicted with incoming skiers (assuming anyone came in during the storm). It would have required extra supplies. And various clients and/or guides may have felt some pressure to get back on time. None of these would preclude staying longer, but factors such as these can influence decisions.
Also the timing of the storm may have been unclear. They would have known conditions and snow totals and rates at the hut but it's possible they thought they could beat the worst of it.
We don't know these things at this time.
3) Why did they take the route they did?
According to a number of people familiar with the huts there is a safer route out. According to the hut people there is no entirely safe route. However, an alternate route is supposedly significantly safer with less avalanche exposure.
There are pros and cons to any decision like this. Apparently the alternate route is longer and involves more difficult routefinding. It also terminates at a different trailhead, necessitating a car shuttle of some kind.
4) Why was essentially the entire group exposed to avalanche terrain?
This is a big question. One of the most basic rules of safe travel is to limit exposure. Ideally to one person at a time in an avalanche area, although this is not always practical. Group members should at least be spread out widely.
With four guides it should have been possible to travel in two separate groups, one leaving a while after the first. Within each group members should have been spread out.
There can be a few common problems implementing this. When breaking trail the leader always goes slowly due to the work involved, and the rest tend to bunch up. Preventing this requires diligence on the part of the guides. Another problem can arise if they regroup. One (unconfirmed) comment claimed they were grouped for a break. Breaks can also be taken with subgroups spread out, and in safe areas.
Visually identifying avalanche terrain in a storm with poor visibility is also difficult, local knowledge or a map with areas identified on it can help. However, limiting exposure is generally done throughout a route as a precaution against the unforeseen. Even when the danger is not so high.
5) Why couldn't they locate all members with their beacons?
Three of the four guides were buried and did not survive. Of the six survivors two were unable to walk. And there was a raging storm. Multiple burials close together are difficult. Time to continue searching was limited by the need to get the survivors back to the road.
Groups should be prepared to self-rescue. There is no indication they were not prepared to do so in a more typical situation, but this was an extreme case. Some of the survivors did succeed in locating some of the other group members.
Final Comments
One expert claimed guided group incidents are rare. However, last season (2024-25) three out of 19 fatal incidents were guided. (One heli skiing, one cat skiing, one touring.) Another was a ski patrol incident. Three of these were in maritime climates. And guided group incidents generally have a higher risk of multiple burials than unguided parties. The reader can draw whatever conclusions they wish from this, they are simply observations.
How will these questions be answered?
There is already a Cal/OSHA investigation slated or underway. As an Occupational agency it's not clear what they will focus on.
The Sheriff is currently investigating whether "Criminal Negligence" should be charged, but this has not been determined. There may be other charges which could, in theory, be brought. It is unusual in the US to investigate avalanche incidents under criminal law, usually it is a civil matter. It should be noted that in many European countries all avalanche accidents are potential criminal matters with civil cases traditionally being less common (but increasing in recent years).
Regardless of any actions taken from these investigations the results will most likely be used in court for civil cases. It takes time to file complaints and prepare cases and we don't know if that will happen, but it is widely assumed complaints will be filed in an appropriate court.
In each case the guide service will have an opportunity to explain it's decisions and actions. Once we have all of the information and arguments and facts we can draw conclusions. For now we should seek answers and not be critical, especially of the clients.
Finally, some questions may arise for the AMGA and particularly for AIARE after the incident is better understood. The AMGA certifies guides based on their technical skills and general guiding abilities. AIARE provides avalanche training, mostly likely for the AMGA as well. While they are quick to allow providers to offer "AIARE courses" all they really provide is a curriculum and materials. When an incident occurs (and there have been 2 deaths on advanced courses) the course is suddenly a provider course with little said about AIARE. In this case there were four guides, all reportedly certified to teach AIARE courses, probably including advanced ones. Which does raise some questions to be asked at a later time.
February 20, 2026
Jim Frankenfield, Avalanche Center director
On Feb 17, 2026 a large avalanche struck a guided group returning from two nights at a hut. The group consisted of 11 clients and 4 guides from Blackbird Mountain Guides.
First I will provide a little background, then some clarifications to issues which seem to be misunderstood by some in the general public, and finally some questions which will need to be answered prior to drawing conclusions or assigning blame. This is not intended to be comprehensive, nor to reach any conclusions about what happened or why.
Blackbird Mountain Guides deserves an opportunity to answer and respond to these questions, and the families of the deceased deserve answers which are thorough and properly researched. The answers will take time, some may ultimately come from investigations by the Sheriff or Cal/OSHA (ongoing already) or from legal cases (which seem likely). At this point (Feb 20) we should not jump to conclusions.
Comments and questions are welcome at the end of the full entry, no registration required. Moderation does take some time due to all the junk/spam. You can also comment/discuss/etc on Facebook on our discussion group (public) at https://www.facebook.com/groups/266870495913623
Background
There are a few things which should be noted while considering the factors behind the incident. Particularly concerning the guided aspect of the trip. These are offered as statements which I believe may be relevant, they are not intended to imply anything.
According to some comments the cost of the three day two night hut trip was $1165 per person, and there were 11 clients. Assuming this cost is accurate and all clients paid that amount the total comes to $12,815. Some of this would be for the hut reservation and supplies. (I have not verified or confirmed these numbers myself.)
Blackbird Mountain Guides has a very restrictive cancellation policy. There is essentially no refund and once a trip is booked participants are expected to go unless the guide service cancels. The policy on their website explicitly states that bad weather is not a reason for clients to back out with a refund.
On their website the guide company states “If you’ve booked the Frog Lake Huts in Truckee, trust our guides to elevate your trip to the next level. We’ll navigate in and out of the huts, manage the risks, and find the best terrain and snow quality for you and your group!”
The individual guides are all certified avalanche instructors for AIARE, a curriculum provider for avalanche safety courses. They are also certified as guides by the AMGA, American Mountain Guide Association.
The huts are very popular, booked for two nights at a time, and bookings sell out soon after they open for the season.
Clarifications
Due to the severity of the incident it has attracted a lot of media attention and a lot of comments by a wide variety of people. Many do not appear to appreciate the nature of the trip or to understand some basics of backcountry recreation and avalanche safety. This is entirely understandable.
These clarifications may seem like statements of the obvious to many whole follow and use this website, or recreate in the backcountry.
Some comments ask why the area was open at all. The huts are located in the backcountry, on land owned by a land trust. Access is via routes (trails) on public Forest Service land. This did not occur within any managed terrain such as a downhill ski area. Many ski areas closed, partly or entirely. Public lands don't close, they are (more or less) accessible to the public at all times. With or without guides.
People comment that the group as whole was too inexperienced, or did something wrong. This was a guided trip for people with backcountry skiing skills but not necessarily adequate risk management or avalanche safety skills. The participants would have all been competent skiers and at least some would probably have had basic avalanche rescue and safety skills. They chose to hire a guide service in recognition of their need for more professional guidance and risk management.
When guides are paid to be responsible for clients they have a duty of care. Final decisions are up to the guide(s), not the clients. Clients can, and often do, express preferences and opinions but the guide(s) make the final call. This should be kept in mind when considering the questions which follow.
Avalanche Beacons - Some who comment do not understand what they are and what their limitations are. These are carried by each person in a group and are used to find any others in the group should they become buried. These are local devices, the range is suitable for partners to search. People have asked if they had these, or why not (implying they lacked them). The entire group had avalanche beacons and in fact the survivors successfully used them for locating some party members.
Avalanche "Flotation" Packs - Numerous people ask why they did not have these. There is no indication they did, nor any that they did not. These packs work on "inverse segregation" - when particles are shaken large ones end up on top. (Try this with a can of mixed nuts.) If the person manages to deploy the pack before or during a ride they have a good track record. Assuming no trees, rocks, etc. If the snow comes down from above onto a person or group they are not so useful. It appears that is what happened in this case. Carrying them on a trip like this would be appropriate but in this particular avalanche they may not have helped much. They do not replace beacons, they supplement them. One analysis in the US and Canada indicates that, overall (in all kinds of avalanches), they improve survival odds about 11%.
Questions to be Answered
Many questions are being asked more as statements than questions. Blackbird Mountain Guides deserves an opportunity to answer and respond to these questions, and the families of the deceased deserve answers which are thorough and properly researched. The answers will take time, some may ultimately come from investigations by the Sheriff or Cal/OSHA (ongoing already) or from legal cases (which seem likely). At this point (Feb 20) we should not jump to conclusions.
1) Why did they go out in such storm conditions?
Guide services do operate in dangerous conditions, it is not unusual or unprecedented. Group management and terrain choices play important roles in doing this safely. We don't know if they had a thought-out or written risk management plan. If they did we don't know if they followed it or deviated from it.
This was a multi-day trip beginning Sunday and the avalanche was on Tuesday. The avalanche bulletin on Sunday morning gave a danger rating of Moderate (2/5) with a predicted Considerable (3/5) Monday. It did not extend beyond that. A short time after it was published an Avalanche Watch was issued, which means a warning may follow. There was passing mention of a major storm cycle but not a lot of emphasis. It refers people to the Reno National Weather Service (NWS) for weather information.
On Tuesday morning the bulletin rated the danger as High (4/5). The group was at the hut at this point, on their final day with plans to leave and go home. We don't know how much information they got while there, or what the sources were. They claim their guides were in contact with their head people in the office, and the hut had communications available.
Aside from the avalanche bulletin the NWS had been forecasting the storm for some time. However, the details available on the timing and the accuracy of such details is not clear right now.
Given the cancellation policy it would have been hard for clients to decide not to go, especially given that the guide service indicates that weather is not a good reason. It would have been mostly up to Blackbird Mountain Guides to make a decision to cancel.
One way for guides to manage risk during high danger is to choose the terrain appropriately. In this case there was a hut reservation so aside from choosing one of several routes the destination was fixed.
2) Why didn't they stay at the huts on Tuesday, given conditions?
This is assumed to have been an option. It may have conflicted with incoming skiers (assuming anyone came in during the storm). It would have required extra supplies. And various clients and/or guides may have felt some pressure to get back on time. None of these would preclude staying longer, but factors such as these can influence decisions.
Also the timing of the storm may have been unclear. They would have known conditions and snow totals and rates at the hut but it's possible they thought they could beat the worst of it.
We don't know these things at this time.
3) Why did they take the route they did?
According to a number of people familiar with the huts there is a safer route out. According to the hut people there is no entirely safe route. However, an alternate route is supposedly significantly safer with less avalanche exposure.
There are pros and cons to any decision like this. Apparently the alternate route is longer and involves more difficult routefinding. It also terminates at a different trailhead, necessitating a car shuttle of some kind.
4) Why was essentially the entire group exposed to avalanche terrain?
This is a big question. One of the most basic rules of safe travel is to limit exposure. Ideally to one person at a time in an avalanche area, although this is not always practical. Group members should at least be spread out widely.
With four guides it should have been possible to travel in two separate groups, one leaving a while after the first. Within each group members should have been spread out.
There can be a few common problems implementing this. When breaking trail the leader always goes slowly due to the work involved, and the rest tend to bunch up. Preventing this requires diligence on the part of the guides. Another problem can arise if they regroup. One (unconfirmed) comment claimed they were grouped for a break. Breaks can also be taken with subgroups spread out, and in safe areas.
Visually identifying avalanche terrain in a storm with poor visibility is also difficult, local knowledge or a map with areas identified on it can help. However, limiting exposure is generally done throughout a route as a precaution against the unforeseen. Even when the danger is not so high.
5) Why couldn't they locate all members with their beacons?
Three of the four guides were buried and did not survive. Of the six survivors two were unable to walk. And there was a raging storm. Multiple burials close together are difficult. Time to continue searching was limited by the need to get the survivors back to the road.
Groups should be prepared to self-rescue. There is no indication they were not prepared to do so in a more typical situation, but this was an extreme case. Some of the survivors did succeed in locating some of the other group members.
Final Comments
One expert claimed guided group incidents are rare. However, last season (2024-25) three out of 19 fatal incidents were guided. (One heli skiing, one cat skiing, one touring.) Another was a ski patrol incident. Three of these were in maritime climates. And guided group incidents generally have a higher risk of multiple burials than unguided parties. The reader can draw whatever conclusions they wish from this, they are simply observations.
How will these questions be answered?
There is already a Cal/OSHA investigation slated or underway. As an Occupational agency it's not clear what they will focus on.
The Sheriff is currently investigating whether "Criminal Negligence" should be charged, but this has not been determined. There may be other charges which could, in theory, be brought. It is unusual in the US to investigate avalanche incidents under criminal law, usually it is a civil matter. It should be noted that in many European countries all avalanche accidents are potential criminal matters with civil cases traditionally being less common (but increasing in recent years).
Regardless of any actions taken from these investigations the results will most likely be used in court for civil cases. It takes time to file complaints and prepare cases and we don't know if that will happen, but it is widely assumed complaints will be filed in an appropriate court.
In each case the guide service will have an opportunity to explain it's decisions and actions. Once we have all of the information and arguments and facts we can draw conclusions. For now we should seek answers and not be critical, especially of the clients.
Finally, some questions may arise for the AMGA and particularly for AIARE after the incident is better understood. The AMGA certifies guides based on their technical skills and general guiding abilities. AIARE provides avalanche training, mostly likely for the AMGA as well. While they are quick to allow providers to offer "AIARE courses" all they really provide is a curriculum and materials. When an incident occurs (and there have been 2 deaths on advanced courses) the course is suddenly a provider course with little said about AIARE. In this case there were four guides, all reportedly certified to teach AIARE courses, probably including advanced ones. Which does raise some questions to be asked at a later time.
